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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
III. Adjective Law-Procedure
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
THE PETITION
During the past six months the Council of the Louisiana State
Law Institute has been considering the case of notice pleading
versus fact pleading-an issue which it has just resolved through
the retention of the latter in principle. Thus far, however, agree-
ment has not been reached upon all of the details. One of the
principal arguments advanced by the writer, as Reporter on the
title on Pleading, to support his recommendation to discard fact
pleading, was the extreme difficulty which even the ablest appel-
late courts sometimes experience in distinguishing between alle-
gations of ultimate fact and conclusions of law in borderline
cases. Allegations that the plaintiff is a "holder in due course" or
"purchaser in good faith," or a "possessor in good faith," or that
the defendant "converted" certain property to his own use, or that
either party has had the "real and actual possession" of property,
not only have resulted in diametrically opposite holdings by the
highest courts of the various American jurisdictions, but have as
often caused a division of opinion among the justices of the same
appellate court.' Florida Molasses Company v. Berger2 is one of
the cases falling within the troublesome penumbra zone, though
surprisingly enough, there was no dissent from the opinion writ-
ten by Mr. Justice McCaleb. Under an allegation "that the four
named defendants, on or about May 13th or 14th, appropriated
and converted [one hundred ninety odd thousand gallons of
molasses] to their own use,"8 the plaintiff obtained an attachment
of the property on the ground of the nonresidence of defendants.
Motions to dissolve the attachment, and exceptions of no right or
cause of action, all based upon the contention that these aver-
ments were conclusions of law and not allegations of fact, were
overruled by the Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of
the court below. In sweeping language, Mr. Justice McCaleb
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. On these points see Cook, Statement of Fact in Pleading under the
Codes, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416 (1921); Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Facts,"
4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 233 (1937); Clark on Code Pleading 225 et seq. (2 ed.
1947).
2. 220 La. 31, 55 So. 2d 771 (1951).
3. 220 La. 31, 39, 55 So. 2d 771, 774.
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said, "This is clearly a recital of facts which, if proved, would
entitle plaintiff to judgment against the defendants in solido, as
joint tort-feasors. We think that it would take a narrow and
strained aspect of the pleadings to conclude that the well-
understood words 'appropriate and convert' meant anything other
than a wrongful or unlawful taking of another's property, i.e.,
a tort."
4
While it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the result in this
case with that reached by the majority of the court on rehearing
in the leading case on fact pleading-State v. Hackley, Hume &
Joyce 5 -it is entirely consistent with the holding of a much later
Louisiana case6 and is in complete harmony with the Supreme
Court's present trend towards liberality of pleading.
ExCEPTIONS
Four cases decided during the past term involved the question
as to the applicability of the well-settled rule that every person
who may be affected by the judgment must be made a party to the
proceeding. In Horn v. Skelly Oil Company,7 plaintiff brought suit
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act for a determina-
tion of the ownership of seven-eighths of the mineral rights of a
tract of land of which the plaintiff owned a similar proportion of
the surface rights. Plaintiff contended that a reservation, made by
the Federal Land Bank in an act of sale to one of his ancestors in
title created a mineral servitude which had been extinguished by
the non-user of ten years, and which consequently reverted to the
owners of the surface. Contrariwise, the defendants contended
that such reservation merely created a mineral royalty which
prescribed ten years thereafter because of non-use, and, since it
was an appendage to the mineral interest, it reverted to the own-
ers thereof. Since the Federal Land Bank had not been made a
party to the litigation, the proceedings were remanded to permit
it to be impleaded in the court below.
In Doll v. City of New Orleans,8 the owner of real estate
4. 220 La. 31, 39-40, 55 So. 2d 771, 774.
5. 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909).
6. Ciaccio v. Hartman, 170 La. 949, 129 So. 540 (1930), holding that the
allegation that the plaintiff was in the "real and actual possession" of the
property was an allegation of ultimate fact and not a conclusion of law. That
the strict rules of fact pleading are not applied in Louisiana with respect to
the four great real actions is attested by the forms set forth in Flemming's
Formulary 482-483, 504-506 (McEnerny's 3 ed. 1933) which are completely
supported by Ciaccio v. Hartman, supra.
7. 60 So. 2d 65 (La. 1952).
8. 221 La. 446, 59 So. 2d 449 (1952).
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sought to recover certain rents collected from the then tenants
by the city under a mistaken belief that it was the owner of the
property under a tax adjudication. On appeal from a judgment
of the First City Court of New Orleans in favor of plaintiff, the
intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment and dismissed
the suit, upholding the city's defense that since it was not acting
in behalf of plaintiff at the time these rents were erroneously
collected, an affirmance of the judgment might subject the city
to a double recovery if sued subsequently by the tenants for
recovery of the rents erroneously paid, and that consequently
these tenants were indispensable parties to the litigation. By a
divided vote under the writ of review, the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the court of appeal. Justices Hawthorne and Moise
dissented, being of the opinion that the judgment against the city
in the instant case would afford it full protection against any
subsequent suit by the tenants, and that hence the latter were not
indispensable parties to the litigation.
The third case in this series0 presented a less difficult question.
An action brought against the operator of a mineral lease who
owned only a half-interest in the lease, for the cancellation of the
lease except with respect to a ten acre tract around a producing
well, resulted in a judgment for plaintiff in the trial court. On
appeal the judgment was reversed and the suit remanded to
permit the impleading of the owner of the other half of the min-
eral lease, who was held to be an indispensable party to the suit.
The last of these cases, Marrero Land & Improvement Associ-
ation v. Duplantis,'0 presented issues both of misjoinder of parties
defendant and lack of indispensable parties. Plaintiff alleged that
a construction company, acting under a contract with the City of
Westwego, had dug a number of large drainage canals on plain-
tiff's property; that after the failure of the construction company
to refill the canals upon demand, plaintiff had employed a third
person to do so; and that when the latter had attempted to do
this work, he had been arrested by the city officials of Westwego,
who had informed him upon his release that if he continued with
such work he would be again arrested and incarcerated. Injunc-
tive relief was prayed for by plaintiff to prevent such officials
from disturbing its possession of property which it had possessed
for more than a year. Reversing the judgment of the court below
dismissing plaintiff's suit, the appellate court overruled defen-
9. Jamison v. Superior Oil Co., 220 La. 928, 57 So. 2d 896 (1952).
10. 221 La. 540, 59 So. 2d 829 (1952).
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dants' exceptions of misjoinder, lack of indispensable parties and
no cause of action. It held that the facts alleged disclosed a right
to injunctive relief, that the defendant city officials were prop-
erly joined as defendants, and that the City of Westwego was not
an indispensable party to the litigation.
Two other cases presented an issue as to whether exceptions
of no right or cause of action should be maintained. In one," the
appellate court overruled the exceptions, which had been referred
to the merits by the trial judge, on the ground that the allegations
of plaintiff's petition were sufficient. In the second, Arata v.
Orleans Capitol Stores, 2 the trial court had sustained an excep-
tion of no cause of action to the plaintiff's petition, and this ruling
had been sustained by the intermediate appellate court. Plaintiff
sued primarily to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by his minor son, when he was thrown from a bicycle when it
struck a depression in a concrete sidewalk adjoining the named
defendant's property. Both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court sustained the exception on the ground that plain-
tiff's allegations showed clearly that his minor son had been negli-
gent. Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment and overruled the exception. Applying the now settled
rule that exceptions of no right or no cause of action raising the
issue of contributory negligence appearing from the allegations
of the petition should not be maintained unless the alleged facts.
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the proxi-
mate cause of the accident was the negligence of plaintiff, the
organ of the court found that the factual allegations left consid-
erable doubt as to the issue of contributory negligence. Accord-
ingly, this doubt was resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
In overruling exceptions sustained by trial courts in two
other cases, the Supreme Court again demonstrated its liberal
11. Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La. 921, 54 So. 2d 325 (1951), where plaintiffs
sued to recover an interest in property formerly owned by the marital com-
munity of their parents, and which had been sold to defendant's ancestor in
title by their father after the death of the mother. In overruling exceptions
of no right and no cause of action, referred to the merits by the trial judge,
the Supreme Court held that the petition adequately and accurately described
their claim as heirs of their deceased mother and brothers. Defendant's
exception of the acquisitive prescription of ten years was overruled, since
the evidence disclosed that both defendant and his ancestor in title had full
knowledge of all of the facts constituting plaintiff's claim prior to their pur-
chase, and hence were possessors in bad faith. The case was remanded for
further evidence on the issues of the enhanced value of the land due to
defendant's improvements, and the extent of the warrantor's obligation to
defendant.
12. 219 La. 1045, 55 So. 2d 239 (1951).
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views of pleading. In Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Board,18
an exception of the prescription of one year levelled at plaintiff's
action to be restored to his former teaching position and for back
salary was overruled by the appellate court, and the judgment
rejecting plaintiff's demand was reversed. The prescription in
question was held to have been interrupted by the filing well
within the year of summary proceedings for reinstatement, and
the institution of the present proceedings within ten days of the
finality of the Supreme Court's dismissal of the summary pro-
ceedings. In Weiser v. Di Cristina,14 the trial court held that plain-
tiff's previously dismissed suit for specific performance of an
agreement to sell real estate, brought against the prospective pur-
chaser, was res judicata of the second suit brought against the
prospective purchaser and the real estate broker for a decree of
forfeiture of the prospective purchaser's deposit. Since the object
of the first suit was to enforce specific performance and that of
the second was to decree the forfeiture of the deposit, and since
the defendant real estate broker had not been a party to the first
suit, the Supreme Court properly held that the first action was
not conclusive of the second.
THE RECONVENTIONAL DEMAND
Article 375 of the Code of Practice, announcing the basic rule
on the subject, permits the reconventional demand to be filed
only when it is "necessarily connected with and incidental to" the
principal demand. This requirement of connexity is relaxed, how-
ever, when there is diversity of residence between the plaintiff
and defendant. In divorce and separation cases, when the two
litigants reside in the same parish, usually there can be little if
any connection between the two demands, and hence a reconven-
tional demand ordinarily is not permitted. 15 Meyers v. Hackler16
presented unusual circumstances. The two demands were so
connected and interrelated that the Supreme Court upheld the
filing of the wife's reconventional demand for a separation on
the ground of cruel treatment to the plaintiff's demand for a
divorce on the ground of adultery. While this result was not
novel, it did work a broadening of the rule of an earlier case,17
13. 220 La. 252, 56 So. 2d 413 (1951).
14. 221 La. 306, 59 So. 2d 401 (1952).
15. Dowie v. Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921); Bullock v. Bullock, 174
La. 839, 141 So. 852 (1932) and cases cited; Williams v. Williams, 212 La. 334,
31 So. 2d 818 (1947).
16. 219 La. 750, 54 So. 2d 7 (1951).
17. Landry v. Regira, 188 La. 950, 178 So. 502 (1938).
[VOL. XIII
,VORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
which was decided under facts which were the exact converse of
those in the principal case.
The procedure employed and the facts of C. W. Greeson Com-
pany v. Harnischfeger Corporation18 are too involved and com-
plicated to permit of complete statement and analysis within
present limitations. A discussion of the law relating to attach-
ment applied in this case will be discussed later;19 but the unusual
procedure employed with respect to the reconventional demand
merits attention at this point. The defendant originally sued the
present plaintiff to recover the balance due on an open account
covering the purchase of a dragline and accessory equipment.
Defendant promptly reconvened for damages for alleged breach
of contract. During the trial of the case, finding that the potential
damages were in excess of those claimed in the reconventional
demand, counsel for the reconvening defendant discontinued his
reconventional demand. While the main demand was pending
undecided, counsel filed a new reconventional demand for a larger
sum. Alleging the nonresidence of the defendant in reconvention,
the plaintiff therein attached the right, title and interest of the
defendant in reconvention in the principal demand. The Supreme
Court reversed the trial court which had dismissed the second
reconventional demand as coming too late and had sustained the
exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae and
the exceptions of no right or cause of action. The court held that
since the second reconventional demand was filed while the main
demand was pending in the trial court, it was timely. The excep-
tions of no right or cause of action were overruled. A claim for
damages for the dissolution of the attachment-was relied upon
by the appellate court as constituting an appearance by the defen-
dant in reconvention which cured his objections to the jurisdic-
tion ratione personae of the trial court. The case is noteworthy
with respect to two procedural tactics employed by the defendant
in reconvention, though no issue as to the regularity or propriety
thereof was ever presented to the Supreme Court. After moving
to dissolve the attachment, the defendant in reconvention filed a
reconventional demand to the reconventional demand, claiming
damages for the illegal issuance of the writ of attachment at the
instance of the plaintiff in reconvention. Defendant in reconven-
tion also filed exceptions to the reconventional demand. The
writer knows of no code, statutory or jurisprudential authority
18. 219 La. 1006, 54 So. 2d 528 (1951).
19. Infra, p. 320.
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for the filing of a reconventional demand to a reconventional
demand. Under the circumstances, however, there can be no
question but that this procedure obviated an undesirable circuity
of action. With respect to the filing of exceptions to the recon-
ventional demand, the Louisiana cases are in conflict. The earlier
ones 20 treat the filing of an answer or exceptions to a reconven-
tional demand as prohibited replications. A few recent cases 21
appear to permit the filing of an answer and exceptions to the
reconventional demand.
THE TRIAL
No cases of any particular importance relating to trial pro-
cedure were decided by our Supreme Court during the past year.
In Fellows v. Fellows,22 the appellate court sustained the action
of a trial judge in refusing to grant a jury trial in an action
brought to annul a will on the ground of forgery. This decision
was in strict accord with the applicable code provision on the
subject. 23 In the second case,24 where the plaintiff sued the defen-
dants to recover the sum of $4,650 entrusted to them for safekeep-
ing, both the trial and appellate courts found that plaintiff's
testimony and corroborative circumstances satisfied the require-
ments of Article 2277 of the Civil Code 25 as to the proof of such
an obligation. In a third case,26 where over the strenuous objec-
tions of the defendant the trial judge permitted the reopening of
the case four months after its submission, in order to permit
plaintiff to introduce evidence of a completely new issue not
previously raised by the pleadings, the Supreme Court held the
trial judge's action erroneous.
20. Pierce v. Millar, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 354 (La. 1825); Suarez v. Duralde, 1 La.
260 (1833); Stone v. Carter, 5 La. 448 (1838); G. M. Bayly & Pond v. Stacey &
Poland, 30 La. Ann. 1210 (1878); Evans v. District Grand Lodge No. 21,
G.U.O.O.F., 151 So. 664 (La. App. 1933).
21. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ross, 155 La. 545, 99
So. 443 (1924); Woodward-Wight & Co. v. Haas, 149 So. 161 (La. App. 1933).
22. 220 La. 407, 56 So. 2d 733 (1951).
23. "All causes tried before a court of probate shall be decided without
the intervention of a jury, even if the parties should wish for one." Art. 1036,
La. Code of Practice of 1870.
24. Cormier v. Douct, 219 La. 915, 54 So. 2d 177. (1951).
25. "All agreements relative to movable property, and all contracts for
the payment of money, where the value does not exceed five hundred dollars,
which are not reduced to writing, may be proved by any other competent
evidence; such contracts or agreements, above five hundred dollars in value,
must be proved at least by one credible witness, and other corroborating
circumstances."
26. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 220 La. 43,
55 So. 2d 775 (1951).
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NEW TRIAL
In De Frances v. Gauthier,27 judgment by default had been
rendered against defendant on eight checks issued to plaintiff,
the payment of which had been refused by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, defendant moved in the trial court for a new trial,
alleging that the checks had been given in payment of gambling
debts and hence had an illegal consideration. The trial judge
refused a new trial, and defendant appealed, assigning the refusal
to grant a new trial as error, and also filing an affidavit in the
appellate court setting out for the first time alleged facts which
he contended supported his application for a new trial. The
appellate court refused either to grant a new trial or to remand
the case to permit defendant to introduce evidence supporting
his application for a new trial.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
During the past two years, in an effort to relieve the conges-
tion of a badly overcrowded docket, the Supreme Court has care-
fully scrutinized the jurisdiction of all cases lodged with it. This
has resulted in numerous transfers of appeals to the intermediate
appellate courts when the transcript failed to disclose affirma-
tively the appellate jurisdiction of our highest court.28 This strict
examination of jurisdictional grounds, now implemented by a
rule29 which requires the brief of the appellant to set forth "a
statement of the appellate jurisdiction of [the Supreme Court]
as applied to the case," has produced during the past term a more
bountiful harvest of transferred cases than in previous years.
The sheer number of these transfers, as well as the questions
decided in the more important cases, should serve as caveats to
the practicing lawyers of the state, and eventually reduce to a
minimum the number of cases improperly appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Six appeals30 in mandamus cases, where no showing was
27. 220 La. 145, 55 So. 2d 896 (1951).
28. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951
Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 121, 189-194 (1952).
29. Rule X, § 2, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which
went into effect on January 1, 1952.
30. Kramer v. State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, 219 La. 817,
54 So. 2d 95 (1951); State ex rel. Roussel v. Grace, 219 La. 1000, 54 So. 2d 428
(1951); State ex rel. Pope v. Bunkie Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 219 La. 1035, 55
So. 2d 236 (1951); Orleans Parish School Board v. City of New Orleans, 219
La. 1063, 55 So. 2d 245 (1951); Allen v. Republican State Central Committee,
220 La. 722, 57 So. 2d 413 (1952); and State ex rel. Doane v. General Longshore
Workers, I.L.A. Local Union 1418, 221 La. 216, 59 So. 2d 126 (1952).
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made of a monetary or property interest involved, were trans-
ferred to the various courts of appeal. Similarly, appeals in cases
where the plaintiff sought to annul a local option referendum8 '
and to reverse the decision of the Democratic State Central Com-
mittee dismissing plaintiff's objections to the qualifications of
another gubernatorial candidate32 were held not to fall within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and were trans-
ferred.
In Ledet v. Rodgers,33 plaintiff had sued for $2,391.50, and
defendant's answer admitted that $409.50 was due, but incor-
porated a reconventional demand for $1,200. The court held that
appellate jurisdiction must be determined by the amount in dis-
pute on the main demand at the time of its submission to the trial
court. Since less than $2,000 was at issue at that time, the case
was transferred to the proper court of appeal. The privilege of
the appellate court to disregard a grossly inflated claim of the
plaintiff and to determine appellate jurisdiction upon the largest
amount which plaintiff could reasonably recover was again exer-
cised.34 There, plaintiff sued a laundry to recover $2,500 for dam-
ages for mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation for its
failure to deliver a suit in time for his wedding. Since the largest
amount which plaintiff could recover was less than its jurisdic-
tional minimum, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal.
Where no affirmative showing of the amount in dispute was
made by the transcript, the Supreme Court refused to accept
jurisdiction. Such cases included one where plaintiff sued to
recover a half interest in land, and the record failed to show the
value of the disputed interest;3 5 and another where the plaintiff
sued for the removal of a fence from public property and for
damages to plaintiffs' land and the transcript failed to provide
any corroboration of plaintiffs' speculation as to the extent of tMue
damage to their property.36 In Martin v. Carroll,37 the pleadings
failed to recite the value of the land in dispute, and the highest
appraisal thereof disclosed by the evidence introduced was $239.12.
The appeal was transferred, despite a stipulation of the litigants
that "the value of the property in contest, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, be considered as in excess of $2,000."
31. Ginn v. Village of Bonita, 220 La. 336, 56 So. 2d 567 (1952).
32. Grace v. Boggs, 220 La. 22, 55 So. 2d 768 (1951).
33. 220 La. 650, 57 So. 2d 217 (1952).
34. Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, 60 So. 2d 86 (La. 1952).
35. Newman v. McClure, 221 La. 556, 59 So. 2d 882 (1952).
36. Collins v. Zander, 221 La. 275, 59 So. 2d 188 (1952).
37. 220 La. 481, 56 So. 2d 843 (1952).
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The transcripts of appeal in two injunction cases failed to
establish affirmatively any amount in dispute, and in both the
appeals were transferred. In one,88 the appeal was from a prelim-
inary injunction restraining the defendant lessor from construct-
ing a fence across the backyard of the leased property. In the
other,3 9 an undertaker sought to restrain the State Board of
Embalmers from trying plaintiff on certain charges and taking
disciplinary action against him.
In one instance, where two separate and distinct cases had
been consolidated for trial, and a single transcript had been pre-
pared for the appeals from the separate judgments, the Supreme
Court reviewed the case falling within its jurisdiction, and since
it had no appellate jurisdiction over the second case, the Supreme
Court transferred it to the court of appeal. The fact that these
cases were tried together in the lower court, and that a single
transcript was prepared, could in no way confer jurisdiction upon
the Supreme Court to review a case involving less than its mini-
mum jurisdictional limit.40
Cavalier v. Original Club Forest4' presented a difficult and
most interesting question which resulted from the freedom of
cumulation of actions under Louisiana practice. Plaintiff brought
suit to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained
from an assault and battery and from certain defamatory state-
ments. The trial court rejected plaintiff's demand on the assault
and battery charge, but awarded him damages for the defama-
tory statements. Both litigants appealed. The Supreme Court
held that under the peculiar facts of the case, the defamation
arose "out of the same circumstances" as the physical injuries,
and that hence the intermediate appellate court had appellate
jurisdiction over both claims. Under its precise facts, the result
of the decision appears unexceptionable; but in its opinion the
court took occasion to overrule expressly two former decisions2
which were thought to be in conflict. It appears to the writer that
under the rationale of the overruled cases, the facts of the instant
case might readily have been differentiated and the same result
38. Eddy v. Monaghan, 220 La. 1015, 58 So. 2d 323 (1952),
39. Louisiana Undertaking Co. v. Louisiana State Board of Embalmers,
220 La. 334, 56 So. 2d 566 (1952).
40. Kenney v. Wedderin; C. J. Tessier, Inc. v. Wedderin, 220 La. 285,
56 So. 2d 550 (1951).
41. 220 La. 183, 56 So. 2d 147 (1951), noted in 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 500
(1952).
42. Newsom v. Starns, 174 La. 955, 142 So. 138 (1932); Applewhite v. New
Orleans Great Northern Railway Company, 148 So. 261 (La. App. 1933).
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reached by the court.43 The principal case has provided no substi-
tute test for determining appellate jurisdiction in borderline cases
where two demands having some connection with each other are
cumulated in the same petition.
In Ryan v. Louisiana Society for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals,4 4 plaintiff was granted a permanent injunction abating
an alleged nuisance. Defendant's appeal from the trial court's
judgment was transferred to the court of appeal, for the Supreme
Court found that there was no amount in dispute or fund to be
distributed. Justice LeBlanc dissented on the ground that the
appeal involved the plaintiff's civil right to the quiet enjoyment
of her property free from the disturbances caused by the alleged
nuisance, 45 which right admittedly had a value in excess of $2,000.
Although neither opinion states sufficient facts to enable the
reader to reach any definite conclusion, the probabilities are that
the result reached by the majority was sound, as there appeared
to be no affirmative showing of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction,
which cannot be conferred by the consent or admission of the
parties.
Two appeals from declaratory judgments"4 were transferred
to the intermediate appellate courts, on the ground that there was
no showing of any amount in dispute or fund to be distributed.
These two cases continued the doubt in the minds of the legal
profession as to whether our highest court considered that it
would have appellate jurisdiction over any declaratory judgment
case.47 This uncertainty was dispelled shortly thereafter, how-
ever, when the Supreme Court accepted appellate jurisdiction in
three declaratory judgment cases,4 8 where apparently the records
43. On this point see Note, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 500 (1952).
44. 221 La. 559, 59 So. 2d 883 (1952).
45. Mr. Justice LeBlanc's dissenting opinion was based on Frierson v.
Cooper, 196 La. 450, 199 So. 388 (1940), noted in 1 Loyola L. Rev. 110 (1941).
This case adopted the "defendant's viewpoint theory" in holding that the
test of appellate jurisdiction was the loss which would be sustained by the
defendant if a final judgment was rendered granting plaintiff injunctive
relief.
46. Fireside Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 220 La. 794, 57 So. 2d 687 (1952)
noted in 27 Tulane L. Rev. 121 (1952); and Krokroskia v. Martin, 220 La. 992,
58 So. 2d 205 (1952).
47. See the discussion of the question in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 121, 191-194
(1952).
48. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Production Co.,
60 So. 2d 9 (La. 1952); Southwest Natural Production Co. v. Arkansas Loui-
siana Gas Co., 60 So. 2d 12 (La. 1952); and Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 60 So. 2d 65
(La. 1952).
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affirmatively showed that the mineral interests involved were
considerably in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limit.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Three cases decided during the past term presented the peren-
nial question of whether the judgment of the court below was
appealable. In Succession of Mallary49 at the instance of plain-
tiffs, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring decedent's will
null and void, insofar as it affected property in Louisiana. More
than six months thereafter, the successful plaintiffs took a rule
upon the executrix to show cause why she should not file her final
account, terminate the administration and deliver the assets to
the heirs seeking to be placed in possession. This rule was made
absolute and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly.
Within a year of the rendition of this last judgment, but more
than seventeen months after rendition of the judgment declaring
decedent's will null, the executrix appealed from both judgments,
characterizing the first as an interlocutory decree and the second
as a final judgment. The Supreme Court sustained appellees'
motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the judgment avoiding
the will was a final judgment, while the second was only an inter-
locutory decree implementing the final judgment. It was held
that no appeal from the final judgment could be taken except
within the year of its rendition and that the interlocutory decree
could be reviewed only under a valid appeal from the final judg-
ment which it implemented.
In Oliphint v. Oliphint,5° the court overruled a motion to dis-
miss the appeal based on the contention that the judgment was
neither a final one nor an interlocutory decree causing irreparable
injury. The judgment in question had been rendered in a separa-
tion case after rendition of the final judgment of divorce, and had
dismissed a rule brought by the wife against the husband for
the ascertainment of the community property and for an account-
ing. Since the decree in question disposed of the main contro-
versy between the parties, the Supreme Court held it a final
judgment.
The appellee's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal in a con-
tested election case5 ' was sustained by the court. An appeal had
been taken from a ruling of the trial judge, made during the trial
49. 220 La. 825, 57 So. 2d 737 (1952).
50. 219 La. 781, 54 So. 2d 18 (1951).
51. Waguespack v. Richard, 220 La. 661, 57 So. 2d 220 (1952).
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of the case, excluding certain ballot boxes from evidence on the
ground that no proof had been submitted to show that they had
not been tampered with. The court properly held that this ruling
was neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory decree causing
irreparable injury.
In two cases 52 orders of appeal had been taken, the transcript
prepared and lodged in the appellate court. In neither of these
cases, however, had the appellant ever filed an appeal bond. On
motion of the appellee, the appeals were dismissed. A similarly
trite rule was employed to dismiss the appeal in another case,5 3
where plaintiff's demands against one defendant had been dis-
missed under exceptions, and no appeal from the judgment of
dismissal was taken by plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that
the other defendant's appeal from a final judgment against him
did not bring up for review the judgment rejecting plaintiff's
demand against the co-defendant.
R.S. 18:364 requires that any appeal in a contested election
case be lodged in the appellate court within five days from the
rendition of judgment in the trial court. In Gouaux v. Guidry5 4
plaintiff appealed to the intermediate appellate court from a
judgment of the trial court dismissing his suit under exceptions.
The appeal was lodged in the court of appeal within five days of
the rendition of judgment by the court of first instance, but the
intermediate appellate court held that it had no jurisdiction over
the appeal and transferred it to the Supreme Court, where the
record was lodged within the thirty days allowed for the transfer.
Appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had
not been filed in the Supreme Court within the statutory five
day period was overruled.
In Hagstette v. Wadsworth"5 the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that it presented only a moot issue. From a judgment
ordering the judicial sale of property to effect a partition, the
plaintiffs took a devolutive appeal, complaining of the failure of
the trial judge to order a survey of the property to be sold. While
the appeal was pending, the property was sold under the court
order. Since the validity of the sale could not be questioned on
52. Rosier v. Good Pine Lumber Co. of Louisiana, 221 La. 531, 59 So. 2d
826 (1952); Whatley v. Good Pine Lumber Co. of Louisiana, 221 La. 534, 59
So. 2d 827 (1952).
53. Carlson v. Ewing, 219 La. 961, 54 So. 2d 414 (1951).
54. 220 La. 916, 57 So. 2d 894 (1952).
55. 220 La. 666, 57 So. 2d 222 (1952).
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appeal, the failure of the trial judge to order a survey of the
property was held to have become a moot question.
SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
Heirs of P. L. Jacobs, Incorporated v. Johnson 6 presented for
the first time the question of whether the mere mailing by regis-
tered mail or special delivery of the application for a writ of
review within thirty days of the court of appeal's denial of an
application for rehearing satisfied the constitutional requirement
that such an application be filed in the Supreme Court within a
thirty day period. It was held that the constitutional provision
was mandatory, and that in view of the failure of the applicant
to comply therewith, the Supreme Court could not consider the
application.
In Box v. May,57 believing that an important question of law
was presented, the Supreme Court granted a writ of review to a
decision of one of the courts of appeal. After consideration, it was
found that only issues of fact were involved, and as there
appeared to be no manifest error in the findings of the intermedi-
ate appellate court, the writ was recalled and the case affirmed.
In a contested election case 58 the trial judge failed to render
his judgment within the twenty-four hours allowed by the perti-
nent statute. At the instance of one of the litigants, alternative
supervisory writs were issued ordering the trial judge either to
render and sign his judgment on or before March 12, 1952, or to
show cause to the contrary on a later date fixed by the Supreme
Court. In his return to the writs, the trial judge contended that
the writs should be recalled since (1) the twenty-four hours
allowed by statute had now elapsed; and (2) the question was
now moot since under the pertinent act the ballots were required
to be in the hands of the state printer by a date which had then
passed. Both points were swept aside by the Supreme Court
in unmistakable language. The trial judge's failure to comply
with his mandatory duty was held not to excuse his continued
failure to render and sign the judgment. The second objection
was held "not an issue before [the trial judge] nor a matter that
concerns him." The respondent judge was directed forthwith
and without delay to render and sign his final judgment in the
case.
56. 221 La. 473, 59 So. 2d 691 (1952).
57. 220 La. 846, 57 So. 2d 744 (1952).
58. Waguespack v. Richard, 220 La. 859, 57 So. 2d 748 (1952).
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CONSERVATORY WRITS
In two cases the actions of the defendants in seeking affirma-
tive relief were held to constitute a waiver of their objections to
defective citations and to the court's lack of jurisdiction ratione
personae: In both, writs of attachment issued on the ground of
the nonresidence of the defendants were maintained. In C. W.
Greeson Company v. Harnischfeger Corporation,5 9 after moving
for a dissolution of the writ, the defendant reconvened, praying
for damages for the illegal issuance of the writ. Florida Molasses
Company v. Berger" applied the settled Louisiana rule that the
bonding of an attachment constitutes a general appearance which
subjects defendant personally to the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that the attachment was bonded after the filing of defen-
dant's motion to dissolve the writ, and after his exceptions to the
citation and jurisdiction ratione personae, was held not to take
the case out of the application of the general rule.
The damages which may be recovered by defendant for the
illegal issuance of a conservatory writ6 was the subject of two
cases. In one,6 2 a sequestration had been dissolved under applica-
tion of the rule that conditional sales agreements are not enforce-
able under Louisiana law. Attorneys testifying in the trial court
to the value of the services rendered by defendant's attorney in
securing the dissolution of the writ were held to be officers of
the court, and as such not entitled to fees as expert witnesses.
In the other,63 a preliminary writ of injunction had been dissolved
by the appellate court on the ground that the affidavits introduced
by plaintiff on the trial of the rule nisi were defective in form
and should have been excluded on objection. In a new suit, the
former defendant sought damages for the illegal issuance of the
writ, which were denied by the Supreme Court because there
had been no final judgment holding that the preliminary injunc-
tion had been wrongfully issued. Such a judgment was held to
be a condition precedent to the maintenance of the action to
recover damages.
59. 219 La. 1006, 54 So. 2d 528 (1951).
60. 220 La. 31, 55 So. 2d 771 (1951). The pleading aspects of the case are
discussed supra, p. 306.
61. For other facets of the problem, see Comment: Attorney's Fees As
an Element of Damage for the Dissolution of Illegally Issued Conservatory
Writs, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 433 (1952).
62. Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Sinclair, 220 La. 226, 56 So. 2d 240 (1951).
63. Building & Const. Tr. Coun. v. Gasoline Plant Const. Corp., 219 La.
834, 54 So. 2d 101 (1951).
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THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDAMUS
In State ex rel. Loraine v. Adjustment Board of City of
Baton Rouge,64 the relator sought to set aside the revocation by
the named defendant of a building permit previously issued, and
to mandamus the named defendant, the City of Baton Rouge
and various of its officials, to reissue the permit which had been
revoked. No exceptions to the summary form of the proceeding
were filed by the defendants and various property owners who
intervened to resist the proceedings. All of them excepted to
relator's petition merely on the ground that it disclosed no right
or cause of action. The objection that the action should have been
brought in a proceeding via ordinaria was overruled, for the
reasons that defendants had failed to except to the form of the
action, that they had had twelve days to answer and prepare
their defenses to the suit, and that they had waived citation of a
supplemental petition filed by the relator. The court recognized
that a mandamus might be sought as an incident of an ordinary
action, but held that since a judgment setting aside the revoca-
tion of the building permit previously issued would leave the
permit in effect, there was no need for mandamus in the instant
case. On the merits, the Supreme Court set aside the revocation,
holding the defendant city's comprehensive zoning ordinance
unconstitutional insofar as it classified relator's property as resi-
dential. The court was of the opinion that as written the ordi-
nance unreasonably deprived relator of the use of its property
without just compensation, and had no substantial relationship
to the health, safety, convenience or general welfare of the
inhabitants of that part of the city.
In the other case on the subject,65 the Supreme Court held
that the relatrix seeking to mandamus the defendant parish
school board for reinstatement had failed to prove the issuance
of a written contract by defendant. The court further recognized
that, under the Teacher's Tenure Act,66 neither mandamus nor
summary proceedings were authorized as a means of effecting
the reinstatement of a teacher wrongfully discharged.
THE REAL ACTIONS
Figuratively speaking, Hill v. Richey6 7 could well serve as a
64. 220 La. 708, 57 So. 2d 409 (1952).
65. State ex rel. Eberle v. Orleans Parish School Board, 221 La. 243, 59
So. 2d 177 (1952).
66. La. R.S. Supp. 1951, 17:411-17:463.
67. 221 La. 402, 59 So. 2d 434 (1952).
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refresher course in the procedural rules relating to the possessory
action. Defendant prosecuted an appeal from the judgment of
the trial court restoring and quieting plaintiff in the possession
of certain timber lands, and reserving to plaintiff the right to
ascertain what timber had been cut and removed therefrom by
defendant and the right to bring further proceedings to recover
the value thereof. Plaintiff answered the appeal, seeking to
amend the judgment appealed from so as to obtain judgment for
the value of the timber removed. In overruling the various
defenses asserted, the Supreme Court practically reviewed all the
rules of the possessory action. The principle that a purely civil
possession of the property, preceded by actual, physical posses-
sion, is sufficient to enable the possessor to prosecute the action
was again applied. The court again held that one who relies on
the prescription of thirty years must have the actual, physical
and corporeal possession of the property he seeks to acquire.
But once such prescription has been commenced and established
without interruption, possession may be preserved by external
and public signs announcing the possessor's intention to preserve
his possession. Such civil possession is sufficient to prescribe as
long as any vestiges of his possesion remain on the property. The
court conceded that one who possesses without title can establish
a prescriptive title only to property included within the limits or
marks of enclosure, but held that since the extent of plaintiff's
possession was fixed with sufficient certainty by fences, remains
of old fences, marks on trees and "no trespassing" signs, such
possession was sufficient to entitle plaintiff to maintain the pos-
sessory action. The judgment appealed from was modified only
to the extent of remanding the case to the trial court for further
proceedings to receive additional evidence as to the value of the
timber removed by defendant.
Ware v. Baucum68 illustrates the difficulty which the courts of
Louisiana experience in employing the jactitory action to force
the alleged owners of mineral rights to institute a petitory action
to establish the validity of their claims. The facts of this case and
the procedure employed by the parties forced the Supreme Court
to go somewhat beyond the limits of previous decisions. Unlike
the situation in International Paper Company v. Louisiana Cen-
tral Lumber Company,"9 where the owner of the mineral servi-
tude was actually and adversely possessing and exercising the
68. 221 La. 259, 59 So. 2d 182 (1952).
69. 202 La. 621, 12 So. 2d 659 (1943).
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mineral rights through the successful development of its lessees,
here it was admitted that there had never been any exploration
or exercise of defendants' alleged mineral interest. Differently
from Frost-Johnson Lumber Company v. Salling's Heirs,70 the
defendant did not convert the slander of title suit into a petitory
action. In the instant case, in the effort to show that they were
in possession of the mineral interest, defendants attempted to
prove that subsequent to the original grant of the servitude (and
well within ten years of the institution of the suit) by notarial
act the then sole owner of the land had acknowledged defen-
dants' ownership of one-half of the minerals under the land. In
view of the admission that there had been no exercise of the
mineral servitude, and the fact that the latter had been granted
more than ten years prior to the institution of suit, the Supreme
Court refused to consider the validity of the acknowledgment,
holding that plaintiffs had made a presumptive and prima facie
showing of their possession. The judgment appealed from was
affirmed.
A much simpler question was presented in Collier v. Marks,
71
where the plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing his peti-
tory action. Previously, the present plaintiff, as defendant in a
jactitory action, had been ordered by the trial court to institute a
petitory action within sixty days or be barred thereafter from
asserting any claim to the property. This judgment had been
affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. As the succeeding
petitory action was not filed within sixty days of the denial by
the Supreme Court of an application for rehearing, the trial
court held the action barred. The Supreme Court affirrhed, hold-
ing that the mere failure to record its decision in the records of
the trial court did not take the case out of the application of the
judicial peremption.
In the remaining case involving a real action, the Supreme
Court held that, under the evidence introduced, a defendant in a
jactitory action who had converted the suit into a petitory action
had failed to prove his ownership of the land in question.7 2
MISCELLANEOUS
In Gabriel v. United Theatres,7" the plaintiff wife had sued to
recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a
70. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1921).
71. 220 La. 521, 57 So. 2d 43 (1952).
72. Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59 So. 2d 693 (1952).
73. 221 La. 219, 59 So. 2d 127 (1952).
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result of a fall in one of defendant's theaters. From an adverse
judgment, the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeal. After the
appeal had been lodged in the appellate court, the plaintiff died
and nearly five years thereafter her husband filed a motion to be
substituted as plaintiff, alleging the marriage and the absence of
issue thereof or of any adopted children. Defendant moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that no beneficiaries specified
under Article 2315 had been made parties to the action within
one year of plaintiff's death. This motion was overruled by the
intermediate appellate court, which annulled the judgment ap-
pealed from and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court set aside
this latter judgment, holding that the action had abated upon
the death of the original plaintiff. Although neither party had
urged the provisions of La. Act 239 of 1946, 7 4 providing that no
action shall abate after issue joined, the Supreme Court took
notice of its existence, but held that it had been repealed impliedly
by the provisions of Act 333 of 1948, amending and re-enacting
Article 2315 of the Civil Code. Two arguments appear to militate
strongly against the validity of this decision. Firstly, the sole pur-
pose of the 1948 statute amending Article 2315 was to include
"children given in adoption" among the statutory beneficiaries,
and nothing in such amendment indicates the slightest intention
to repeal, or to make any exception to the rule expressed in the
1946 act.7 5 Secondly, even assuming that the 1948 amendment to
Article 2315 did repeal Act 239 of 1946, this latter statutory provi-
sion was re-adopted as R.S. 13:3349 in 1950,76 and hence consti-
tutes the latest expression of legislative will.
Plaintiff brought an action against his alleged partners, in
Voinche v. LeCompte Trade School,77 for the dissolution of the
partnership, and for an accounting of its affairs. In the petition,
plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a rule on defendants to show
cause why the books of the alleged partnership should not be
examined by plaintiff's accountant and defendants' accountant.
This rule was made absolute, and the defendants invoked the
74. Incorporated into the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 as Section
3349 of Title 13.
75. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3349 provides that "No act of the legislature . . .
hereafter passed shall be construed as making an exception to this rule,
unless such act specifically and specially makes an exception thereto."
76. On this point, see Duke Power Co. v. Somerset County Board of
Taxation, 125 N.J.L. 431, 15 A. 2d 640 (1940). Cf. City of Alexandria v.
LaCombe, 220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206 (1952).
77. 220 La. 126, 55 So. 2d 889 (1951).
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supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to set aside the
order. The majority of the court, speaking through Justice
Moise, held that since the trial court could appoint auditors at
any time to examine the accounts of litigants, the rule and order
complained of were entirely regular. The alternative writs pre-
viously issued were recalled. Justices LeBlanc and Hawthorne
dissented, the latter assigning written reasons. He took the posi-
tion that since the defendants' books were not to be examined
during the course of the trial, the order was not incidental to the
pending proceedings, and therefore could not be obtained through
summary process.
The validity of the punishment of an attorney for contempt
of the trial court was presented in Gautreaux v. Gautreaux.78 A
petition for a divorce had originally been stricken because of the
scurrilous and indecent matter contained therein. Counsel for
plaintiff then filed a new petition, in substance tracking the former
allegations, but omitting therefrom a few of the indecent phrases.
The trial judge ordered the second petition stricken, and while
he was reading this order to the offending counsel in. open court,
the latter interrupted him and used language which the trial judge
deemed contemptuous. The court thereupon adjudged the attor-
ney guilty of contempt, and sentenced him therefor. When the
trial judge resumed the reading of his order, the attorney again
interrupted him, using abusive and insulting language. The court
again adjudged him guilty of contempt and sentenced him there-
for. Under supervisory writs, the Supreme Court held the trial
judge's action in striking the entire second petition was erroneous,
as the indecent allegations therein could have been expunged
without affecting the remainder of the petition. A majority of
the court set aside the second sentence for contempt, holding that
the two incidents were so interwoven and inseparable as to con-
.stitute but a single offense. Justices Hamiter and Hawthorne dis-
sented from the latter holding of the majority. They were of the
opinion that since the second incident arose after the attorney
had been adjudged guilty of and sentenced for contempt of court,
the two incidents constituted separate offenses.
The interpleader proceedings brought by the plaintiff in
Placid Oil Company v. George79 against the claimants of mineral
interests under land on which plaintiff had obtained production,
were dismissed by the Supreme Court under a writ of review.
78. 220 La. 564, 57 So. 2d 188 (1952).
79. 221 La. 200, 59 So. 2d 120 (1952).
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The judgments of both the trial and intermediate appellate courts
were set aside. After an examination of the case, the Supreme
Court held that plaintiff was not purely a stakeholder, as there
was a strong possibility that plaintiff was obligated to all of the
defendants impleaded.
State v. Bayles,8 0 an expropriation case, presented only fac-
tual issues. Since no manifest error was found in the value of
the land placed by the jury of freeholders before whom the case
was tried, the judgment appealed from was affirmed.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
VENUE-CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
The venue rule that prosecutions for criminal neglect of
family could be brought only in the parish where the father
resided stemmed from the provision in Article 39 of the Civil
Code that the domicile of the mother and children is that of the
father. This limitation operated unfortunately in cases where the
husband had deserted the family, or the wife and children had
been forced to live with the wife's family as a result of the
husband's nonsupport. The parish where the neglected wife and
children resided was interested, but without jurisdiction to
prosecute the husband. The law enforcement officials of the
husband's domicile had jurisdiction over the offense, but there
was frequently a lack of interest on their part. In 1950, a special
venue provision was enacted which provided, in essence, that
the prosecution for nonsupport might be brought (1) in the par-
ish in which the person owing the support resided, (2) in the
parish in which the last matrimonial domicile was established,
or (3) in the parish in which the dependent established a justi-
fiable and bona fide separate residence.'
In State v. Maxie2 this broader venue provision was invoked
to support a prosecution for criminal neglect of family in a parish
where the widowed defendant's children had been living and
cared for by their maternal grandmother. Defense counsel argued
that the offense was committed and the proper place for prosecu-
80. 220 La. 506, 56 So. 2d 852 (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Act 163 of 1950, La. R.S. 1950, 15:16.1.
2. 221 La. 518, 59 So. 2d 706 (1952).
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